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Inter-Ethnic Friendship and Hostility between  
Roma and Non-Roma Students in Hungary 
 
The Role of Exposure and Academic Achievement 
 
Tamás Hajdu – Gábor Kertesi – Gábor Kézdi 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines friendship and hostility relations between Roma students and the 
ethnically homogeneous non-Roma majority in Hungarian schools. Using data on 
friendship and hostility relations of 15-year-old students from 82 schools the study 
focuses on the interaction between exposure to the other ethnic group and academic 
achievement of Roma students. High-achieving Roma students are shown to have 
significantly more friends and fewer adversaries than low-achieving ones, due to better 
inter-ethnic relations while having similar within-ethnic group relations. As a result, 
higher exposure to Roma students translates to more friendship and less hostility from 
non-Roma students in environments where more of the Roma students have higher 
achievement. Therefore, policies helping the achievement of Roma students can have 
immediate as well as long-term positive effects. Simulations suggest that a mixed policy 
of desegregation and closing the achievement gap may best foster positive interethnic 
relations. The results also support that exposure is more likely to improve intergroup 
contact if status is more equal. 
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Roma és nem roma tanulók közti barátságok  
és ellenségeskedések az általános iskolában 
 
Hajdu Tamás – Kertesi Gábor – Kézdi Gábor 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Tanulmányunk a roma és nem roma tanulók közti kapcsolatok (barátságok és 
elutasítások) létrejöttét meghatározó összefüggéseket vizsgálja a nyolcadik évfolyamra 
járó magyarországi tanulók egy mintáján. Az interetnikus barátságok létrejöttét 
alapvetően két hatás befolyásolja: a tanulók iskolai eredményei, illetve az, hogy a diákok 
milyen mértékben vannak kitéve egymás társaságának az osztályban. A jó tanulmányi 
eredményű roma tanulók szignifikánsan több nem roma baráttal és kevesebb nem roma 
ellenséggel rendelkeznek, mint a rosszul tanuló roma fiatalok. Közvetett bizonyítékok – 
az ti., hogy ez az összefüggés az osztálytársak körében ismert tanulmányi átlagra nézve 
robusztusan teljesül, a nem megfigyelhető teszteredményekre nézve pedig nem teljesül – 
utalnak arra, hogy a hatás oksági jellegű lehet. A hatás erősségéhez valószínűleg 
hozzájárul, hogy a magyarországi általános iskolások tartós osztályközösségekben, 
egymást jól ismerve töltik el az általános iskola nyolc évét. Szimulációs számításokkal 
támasztjuk alá azt a következtetésünket, hogy az oktatáspolitika egy kombinált 
stratégiával tudná a leghatékonyabban elősegíteni az interetnikus barátságokat az 
iskolában: egyfelől, ha vegyes osztályok létrehozásával teremtene lehetőséget a roma és 
nem roma gyerekek közötti kontaktusokra, másfelől, ha a roma tanulókra is kiterjedő 
oktatási reformokkal javítaná a hátrányos helyzetű tanulók iskolai teljesítményeit, így 
azzal növelné a roma és nem roma tanulók közötti barátkozások esélyét, hogy csökkenti a 
köztük meglevő társadalmi távolságot. 
 
Tárgyszavak: roma tanulók, általános iskola, interetnikus barátságok és ellenséges-
kedések, iskolai szegregáció 
 
JEL kódok: J15, I24 
5 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Friendship and hostility relations between adolescents from a disadvantaged minority 
and the majority are important elements of social cohesion. Inter-ethnic friendship may 
foster the social integration of members of the minority and may help develop tolerant 
attitudes among members of the majority. Conversely, inter-ethnic hostility in 
adolescence may hinder social integration and may reinforce exclusionary attitudes. 
Schools offer the most important environment for building such relationships among 
adolescents. Understanding what may influence inter-ethnic friendship and hostility 
within schools is an important task for social science research with conclusions for 
educational policies.  
Exposure to the other ethnic group creates opportunities on inter-ethnic 
friendship as well as hostility. But opportunities may not translate into actual 
relationships. Contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) suggest that contact is 
more likely the more equal status the groups have. Academic achievement is an 
important element of status in schools. Thus, one potential mediator of exposure to 
contact is the academic achievement of disadvantaged minority students. Hence, 
environments that help minority students become more successful in school may induce 
more inter-ethnic friendship and less inter-ethnic hostility for the same level of inter-
ethnic exposure. At the same time, students from disadvantaged minorities may lose 
friends and attract hostility from their own group if their success is considered “acting 
white” (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Fryer and Torelli, 2010; Fuller-Rowell and Doan, 
2010). The goal of our study is to shed light on these mechanisms in an environment 
with a clearly disadvantaged ethnic minority and a relatively homogenous majority. 
We analyze friendship and hostility networks of 3,430 students from the Roma 
minority and the non-Roma majority in Hungary. Our data covers eighth-grade students 
in 82 schools spread across 75 towns in Hungary. Our friendship data is based on 
nominations of classmates and is directly comparable to the data used to friendship 
networks of students of similar ages in the U.S. (Currarini et al., 2010; Flashman, 2012; 
Fryer and Torelli, 2010; Patacchini and Zenou, 2016) and Europe (Smith et al., 2014). A 
novelty of our data is an inclusion of adversary a nominations question together with the 
usual friendship nomination questions, enabling us to analyze interethnic hostility in a 
direct way. We measure academic achievement by publicly observable grades as well as 
low-stakes test scores that are unobservable to the students.  
Our first set of results show that Roma students with higher academic 
achievement have significantly more friends than Roma students with lower 
achievement. The difference is driven by having more non-Roma friends, while the 
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number of Roma friends is unrelated to the achievement of Roma students. These results 
are monotonic, approximately linear in grade point average, and they are remarkably 
robust to the measure of friendship, controlling for family background, grade repetition, 
school and class fixed-effects, and common support restrictions. In line with the 
literature, we focus on same-sex relationships, but results for opposite-sex relationships 
are very similar. The patterns for hostility show a mirror image, also driven by 
differences in interethnic relations. In general, students have fewer friends and more 
refusals from the other ethnic group, showing significant inbreeding homophily 
(Jackson, 2014). The degree of inbreeding homophily among non-Roma students is 
lower if members of the other ethnic group have high academic achievement. 
Our second analysis examines the interaction between classroom composition 
and achievement in interethnic friendship and hostility relations. The ethnic 
composition of their peer group is strongly related to the number of friends and 
adversaries of low-achieving Roma students. However, no such association exists for 
high-achieving Roma students: replacing Roma peers with non-Roma peers has no effect 
on the total number of their friends and adversaries. We also find that the exposure of 
non-Roma students to Roma peers is twice as likely to translate into having a Roma 
friend if those Roma peers are high-achievers, and it is less likely to translate into having 
a Roma adversary in that case.  
Finally, we use these results in a simple simulation exercise to illustrate the 
potential effects of two policies: a complete de-segregation program that equalizes the 
ethnic distribution of classes across the nation and the closing of the ethnic achievement 
gap. Assuming that our results show the effect are causal, we find that when the two 
policies are combined, the total number of friends and adversaries of Roma students 
improves slightly. At the same time, the ethnic composition of these relationships 
changes substantially: The overwhelming majority of the within-school friends of Roma 
students become non-Roma, which can enhance their integration into mainstream 
society. We also find that the number of non-Roma students with Roma friends doubles, 
which can lead to lower levels of prejudice in society. With the caveats of causal inference 
from observational data and large-scale policy conclusions based on a partial analysis 
(Carrell et al., 2013), these results suggest directions for educational policy: Achieving a 
more equal ethnic distribution and a narrower achievement gap may both be needed to 
combine improvements in the level and ethnic composition of the friendship relations of 
minority students. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we show important 
determinants of friendship and hostility relations among Roma and non-Roma students, 
an understudied topic despite the large size and severe disadvantages of the Roma 
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minority in many Eastern European countries (see Boda and Néray, 2015; Kisfalusi, 
2016; Lőrincz, 2016 for exceptions, all from very recent years). Second, we show 
evidence of the association between networks and academic achievement as well as its 
interaction with exposure. Third, we show direct evidence regarding hostility as well as 
friendship, an aspect rarely investigated in the school context. Fourth, using the 
estimates of our analysis we provide some predictions concerning the potential effects of 
school desegregation and closing the ethnic achievement gap on interethnic relations. 
Our results suggest that the fear of rejection due to “acting white” by having 
higher achievement is unlikely to be an issue for most Roma students in Hungarian 
schools. On the contrary, Roma students with higher academic achievement have more 
non-Roma friends and fewer non-Roma adversaries, without having fewer Roma friends 
and more Roma adversaries. This adds another, immediately positive effect to policies 
that help minority students attain success in school. More generally, our results suggest 
that intensive exposure to high-achieving minority students can substantially reduce the 
social distance majority students keep from minority students, even in a society that is 
characterized by widespread prejudice. These results are in line with the classic contact 
hypothesis in social psychology that postulates exposure is more likely to improve 
intergroup relations if interactions are more personal and status is more equal (Allport, 
1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). 
2. Background 
The Roma (also known as the Romani people or Gypsies) constitute one of the largest 
and poorest ethnic minorities in Europe. Nearly 80 percent of the Roma live in East-
Central Europe, from the Czech Republic in the North-West through Bulgaria in the 
South-East. Most Roma live in poverty, with low levels of formal employment and other 
disadvantages (FRA and UNDP, 2012). Their low level of education is documented as a 
major contributor to their low employment and low wages (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011a). 
The Roma are the only significant ethnic minority in Hungary, making up about 6 
percent of the population overall and over 10 percent of the population of eighth-grade 
students (Kemény, 2004; Kertesi and Kézdi, 2016). Most of the Roma of Hungary speak 
Hungarian and live in neighborhoods that are ethnically mixed (Kemény and Janky, 
2006). The vast majority of Roma students complete all eighth grades of elementary 
school in Hungary, although with a substantial achievement gap. While almost all Roma 
students continue their studies in a secondary school, less than half of them attain a 
secondary degree in the end (Hajdu et al., 2014). 
Most students complete all eight grades in the same elementary school. Some 
selective secondary schools enroll students earlier, in grades five or seven. This practice 
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is most prevalent in Budapest, and it usually affects elementary schools in more affluent 
neighborhoods. As a result, early enrollment in selective secondary schools has little 
effect on the students of the elementary schools Roma students attend, especially outside 
Budapest. Ethnic segregation of Hungarian schools is moderate on average, but it is high 
in some areas, and approximately half of non-Roma Hungarian children have no Roma 
peers in elementary school (see Kertesi and Kézdi, 2016, and the benchmark results of 
the simulation exercise in this paper). We know relatively little about inter-ethnic 
relations in Hungarian schools; recent studies indicate low levels of inter-ethnic dating 
(Lőrincz, 2016), low levels of inter-ethnic friendship, frequent rejections of Roma 
students by their non-Roma peers (Boda and Néray, 2015). 
Hungarian elementary schools in larger towns and cities, represented by our 
sample, enroll 50 students per grade on average. Some schools are small, with one class 
per grade, while others are larger with two to four classes per grade. Upon enrollment, 
first graders are assigned to a class, and this assignment remains fixed throughout their 
eight years of studies, even in the schools with multiple classes per grade. Class size is 
below 25 on average. This fixed class assignment throughout elementary school results in 
exposure to the same peers for eight years in relatively intimate communities. 
Prejudice against the Roma is strong and widespread in Hungary. The ethnically 
largely homogeneous majority holds and often expresses high levels of explicit prejudice, 
and many maintain a wide social distance from the Roma. For example, 60 percent of 
Hungarian adults agree with the statement that “the inclination for criminality is in the 
blood” of the Roma, and 40 percent support discriminatory bans of Roma customers 
from bars serving alcohol (Bernát et al., 2013; Székelyi et al., 2001; Váradi, 2014) 
3. Data 
To survey the friendship networks and hostility among Roma and non-Roma students, 
we collected data from 82 elementary schools in the 75 towns and cities with the largest 
Roma populations in Hungary in April 2010. We excluded Budapest from the sample due 
to the prevalence of secondary schools recruiting students before grade 8. To ensure 
adequate Roma representation, we oversampled schools with a higher proportion of 
Roma students (the administrative data used for the sampling contained estimates of the 
proportion of Roma students by school but not by grade or class). In each school we 
surveyed all classes in the eighth grade. For our analysis, we retained classes with data 
on at least 10 students (excluding two classes) and valid data on ethnicity and 
friendships for more than two thirds of the students in the class (excluding 25 classes). 
Our final sample comprises 3,430 students from 181 classes in 82 schools in 75 towns. 
The final dataset is available as a Supplementary Material (Data Appendix). 
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The data collection and the appropriateness of the measures taken to ensure 
privacy were reviewed and approved by the Hungarian Education Authority. In addition, 
the parents of the students were informed about the goal of the research, and their 
consent was obtained for the participation of their children. The final data were 
anonymized (no identifiable information was in the records). We provide more details on 
the sampling and the structure of the survey in S1 Appendix. 
Our survey was carried out in classrooms. The first part of the questionnaire 
asked students to nominate friends from their class. In a format identical to the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health of the U.S., we asked respondents to nominate 
up to five of their best male friends and up to five of their best female friends. Then we 
asked them to nominate up to five classmates (female and male combined) with whom 
they would not share a train cabin on a class trip (traditional train cabins host eight 
people in Hungary; class trips by train were familiar to the students). To answer these 
questions, respondents were asked to choose names from a list of all their classmates, 
including those who were absent on the day of the survey. Subsequent parts of the 
questionnaire asked about friends outside the class and school, as well as ethnicity and 
other background information. Of the 3,947 students in the classes of the final sample, 
we have complete information on friend and adversary nominations, as well as grades 
and ethnicity for 3,430 students; they comprise the sample of our analysis. The survey 
data were linked to administrative data on grades and test scores. Table 1 shows the 
summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis.  
The survey asked two questions on the ethnic identity of the students. As most 
Roma in Hungary have a dualHungarian and Romaidentity (Kertesi and Kézdi, 
2011b; Simonovits and Kézdi, 2016), the wording of the questions invited the 
respondents to identify with two ethnic groups at the same time. Of the 3,430 
respondents in our final sample, 710 (21 percent) identified themselves as Roma in one 
of the two questions (16 percent as primary identification, 5 percent as secondary 
identification; Table C1 in S3 Appendix shows the details). This proportion is higher than 
a representative sample would yield because our survey oversampled schools with a 
higher proportion of Roma students. It is slightly lower than the proportion of Roma 
students estimated by the schoolteachers (0.21 versus 0.26 on average; the cross-class 
correlation of the two measures is 0.9). While our sample over-represents classes with 
many Roma students, the Roma are still a minority in most classes of our sample (the 
interquartile range is 8 to 30 percent; Figure C1 in S3 Appendix shows the entire 
distribution). 
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We collected student-level information on grades from the class records. These 
were the summary grade point average (GPA) of the first semester, complemented with 
grades in certain subjects. Hungarian schools give summary grades at the end of the first 
semester as well as in the second semester at the end of the school year. The summary 
grades of the first semester of the eighth grade are high stakes as they are part of the 
scores that determine admission to secondary schools. They are also public information: 
grades are often discussed with students in front of the entire class. Grades range from 1 
(fail) to 5 (excellent). The overall GPA average in our sample is 3.6 (standard deviation 
0.9). The average GPA of Roma students is substantially lower, equal to the 20th 
percentile of GPA among non-Roma students. Behavior grades, on a scale from 2 to 5, 
are also part of the regular grading in Hungary, reflecting potential behavioral problems 
in an obviously coarse way (grade 1 would result in an immediate expulsion from the 
school). The Roma average is low, below the 25th percentile among non-Roma students.  
We linked the students in our sample to their standardized test scores in reading 
skills and mathematics. The source of this test score data is the May 2010 National 
Assessment of Basic Competencies (NABC), which is a low-stakes assessment 
administered to all eighth-grade students in Hungary. In contrast to the GPA and 
specific grades, test scores are not public information; students usually do not know their 
own test scores. The ethnic test score gap in the sample is 0.7 standard deviations in 
reading and 0.9 standard deviations in mathematics. These are somewhat smaller than 
the national test score gap measured for eighth graders (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2016, 2011b), 
reflecting the selected nature of our sample. Figure C2 and Figure C3 in S3 Appendix 
show the distributions of GPA and test scores by ethnicity. 
This study focuses on friendship and hostility relations. Our main friendship 
measure is the number of friendship nominations students receive, or the “indegree” of 
students in network science terminology. In line with the literature, we define the peer 
group as the group of classmates of the same sex, but we show that all of our main results 
are very similar with respect to opposite-sex relationships. We measure hostility by the 
number of adversary nominations students receive: the number of peers who listed the 
student as someone with whom they would not want to share a train cabin. We computed 
nominations from all peers, as well as Roma and non-Roma peers separately. For 
robustness checks, we analyze alternative measures of the relations, including the 
number of peers who nominate the students or are nominated by the students, the 
number of peers who nominate the students and are nominated by the students at the 
same time, and measures that include the popularity of the peers (Echenique and Fryer, 
2007). 
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The number of peers each student could list was capped at five to make our data 
comparable to the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, the prime source of 
student network data in middle schools and high schools in the U.S. (Currarini et al., 
2010; Flashman, 2012; Fryer and Torelli, 2010; Patacchini and Zenou, 2016). In our 
data, 55 percent of the students exhausted the five possibilities for nominating same-sex 
friends; the corresponding figures are 29 percent when nominating opposite-sex friends 
and 24 percent when nominating adversaries (see Table C2 in S3 Appendix for more 
detail). The number of nominations students could receive had no explicit cap other than 
the number of peers, but it too is likely affected by the cap on nominations. For a 
robustness check, we re-estimated our regressions capping the number of nominations 
at four and received very similar results.  
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Table 1.  
Summary statistics 
  All students   Roma Non-Roma 
Variable Mean SD N   Mean Mean 
Roma 0.21 0.41 3430   1.00 0.00 
Number of friendsa 3.8 2.0 3430 
 
3.3 3.9 
Number of adversariesa 1.0 1.7 3430   1.3 1.0 
Number of Roma friendsa 0.7 1.1 3430 
 
1.7 0.5 
Number of Roma adversariesa 0.2 0.5 3430   0.2 0.2 
Number of non-Roma friendsa 3.1 2.1 3430 
 
1.6 3.4 
Number of non-Roma adversariesa 0.8 1.6 3430   1.0 0.8 
GPAb 3.6 0.9 3430 
 
2.9 3.8 
Mathematics gradeb 3.1 1.2 3404 
 
2.4 3.3 
Hungarian gradeb 3.5 1.1 3427 
 
2.8 3.7 
Behavior gradec 4.1 0.9 3427 
 
3.5 4.3 
Standardized test score in mathematicsd -0.3 1.0 3154 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
Standardized test score in readingd 0.0 1.0 3154 
 
-0.6 0.1 
Level of mathematic abilitiese 1.4 1.0 3148 
 
0.9 1.5 
Level of reading abilitiese 2.3 1.1 3148   1.7 2.4 
Repeated grade in past 0.10 0.30 3430   0.23 0.07 
Age 14 years 0.20 0.40 3430 
 
0.14 0.22 
Age 15 years 0.68 0.47 3430 
 
0.62 0.70 
Age 16 years 0.09 0.29 3430 
 
0.18 0.07 
Age 17 years or more 0.03 0.16 3430   0.06 0.02 
Number of years in pre-school 3.15 0.84 3426   2.77 3.25 
Mother's education less than 8 grades 0.04 0.19 3430 
 
0.13 0.01 
Mother's education 8 grades 0.25 0.43 3430 
 
0.55 0.17 
Mother's education vocational secondary school 0.32 0.47 3430 
 
0.24 0.34 
Mother's education high school 0.27 0.44 3430 
 
0.06 0.33 
Mother's education college or more 0.12 0.32 3430 
 
0.02 0.14 
Mother's education missing 0.00 0.05 3430   0.00 0.00 
Fraction Roma in class (from student survey) 0.21 0.20 3430 
 
0.40 0.16 
Fraction Roma in class (teacher assessment) 0.25 0.22 3282 
 
0.44 0.20 
Size of peer group (same-sex classmates) 11.9 3.3 3430 
 
11.3 12.1 
a Nominations received from same-sex classmates 
b from 1 (fail) to 5 (excellent) 
c from 2 to 5 
d Standardized at the national level (mean 0, standard deviation 1) 
e from 0 (inadequate) to 4 (excellent) 
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables in our analysis. It shows the 
mean, standard deviation and number of observations for the entire sample and the 
mean values by ethnicity. On average, students received 3.8 friendship nominations and 
1.0 refusals from their peers. Friendship nominations are distributed relatively 
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symmetrically, whereas adversary nominations have a long right tail: most students are 
not nominated by anyone as an adversary and a few are nominated by many. The shapes 
of the distributions are very similar for Roma and non-Roma students. Figure C4 and 
Figure C5 in S3 Appendix show the empirical densities. 
The average age in the sample is 15 years; 10 percent repeated a grade in the past 
(30 percent of Roma students and 7 percent of non-Roma students). Students spent over 
three years on average in preschool (state-subsidized preschool is available in Hungary 
from age three); the non-Roma average is somewhat higher, and the Roma average is 
2.8. The mothers of Roma students have substantially lower levels of education.  
We use two other data sources in a simulation exercise that illustrates the 
potential policy consequences of the results of our analysis. The first data source is the 
National Assessment of Basic Competencies (NABC), the source of the test score data 
presented above. This is an administrative data set that also contains some school-level 
information, including principals’ estimates of the ethnic composition of the student 
body in their schools. The other data source is the Hungarian Life Course Survey 
(HLCS), a nationally representative survey of 10,000 adolescents with linked records 
from the NABC. In contrast to the individual-level test score data, the HLCS has ethnic 
markers that are of high quality (for more details on the HLCS data, see Kertesi and 
Kézdi, 2011b; Simonovits and Kézdi, 2016). 
4. Results: achievement 
4.1 Achievement and inter-ethnic contacts 
The first question of our analysis is how the number of friends and adversaries of 
students is related to their academic achievement. Beyond the total numbers, we are 
interested in the ethnic composition of these relationships. In our baseline analysis we 
investigate relationships with GPA, and we examine alternative measures of academic 
achievement as extensions. 
First, we show nonparametric regression results. We created categories of GPA 
using increments of 0.5, and estimated the mean number of friends and adversaries in 
those categories separately for Roma students and non-Roma students. To make the 
figures comparable, we normalized the number of friends and adversaries to have a zero 
mean by subtracting their average numbers within each class. Figure 1 shows the results 
for the total number of friends and adversaries. 
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Figure 1.  
Number of friends and adversaries and GPA (grade point average) 
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(A) Friendship nominations & GPA (B) Adversary nominations & GPA 
Notes: The average number of same-sex nominations received by Roma and non-Roma 
students, normalized to average nominations in the class to be zero. Estimated averages 
by GPA category and 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2.  
The number of Roma and non-Roma friends and adversaries by GPA 
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(A) Roma friends & GPA (B) Roma adversaries & GPA 
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(C) Non-Roma friends & GPA (D) Non-Roma adversaries & GPA 
Notes: The average number of same-sex nominations received by Roma and non-Roma 
students from each ethnic group, normalized by average nominations from the respective 
ethnic group in the class. Estimated averages by GPA category and 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Panel A of Figure 1 shows that students with higher GPA have more friends, 
whether they are Roma or non-Roma. Panel B shows the mirror image of that pattern: 
students with higher GPA have fewer adversaries, again regardless of their ethnicity. The 
two graphs show approximately linear relationships of opposite signs and similar 
magnitudes. The Roma and non-Roma lines have similar levels, and the slopes are 
possibly steeper for the Roma. 
The positive association of GPA with the number of friends and its negative 
association with the number of adversaries both come from non-Roma students. 
Whether Roma students nominate others as friends or adversaries is largely unrelated to 
the other students’ GPA. Figure 2 shows the associations according to the ethnicity of the 
friends and adversaries. 
We estimate linear regressions to assess the magnitudes of the associations and 
their robustness. We examine the six left-hand side variables that are shown in Figure 1 
and Figure 2: the total number of friends and adversaries, and the number of Roma and 
non-Roma friends and adversaries. We denote the generic left-hand side variable as rn , 
where n is the number of nominations and superscript r means that these are 
nominations received by the individual. We estimate the following regression for each of 
the six left-hand side variables: 
1 2 3
r
cgi c cgi cgi cgi cgi cgin GPA GPA Roma Roma u            (1) 
where index c is class, g is gender group (male or female), and i is student. 
Coefficients c  are class fixed effects. cgiGPA  is the grade point average of student i in 
gender group g in class c, normalized so that 0 represents the approximate average in the 
sample (3.5). cgiRoma  is whether the student is Roma. Students in different classes may 
develop differential attitudes to their peers and the academic achievement of those peers 
due, for example, to differences in the composition of their class, the differential 
anchoring of their grades, or differences in the teachers or the school environment they 
experience. The class fixed effects eliminate the effect of such differences on the 
estimated friendship–GPA relations to the extent that they affect all students in a class in 
similar ways. As robustness checks, we estimate regressions with class–gender fixed 
effects cg  instead of the class fixed effects c , and obtain very similar results. Standard 
errors are clustered at the class level, taking care of remaining within-class correlations – 
thus, for example, the potential negative correlation of nominations due to the adding-up 
constraint in their number.  
The coefficients of main interest are 1  and 2 . 1  shows the difference in the 
average number of friendship or adversary nominations by two non-Roma students in 
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the same class with a unit difference in GPA. 2  shows the extent to which this is 
different for Roma students, so that 1 2   shows the difference in the nominations 
received by two Roma students in the same class who have different GPA scores. 
Coefficient 3  shows the extent to which Roma students receive more nominations than 
non-Roma students if both have a GPA of 3.5 (the approximate mean in the sample). The 
results of regression (1) are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. 
Friends and adversaries by ethnicity and GPA of the nominated student. 
Dependent variable: 
nominations 
received from peers 
(1) 
Friends  
(2) 
Adversaries 
 (3) 
Friends 
(4) 
Adversaries 
 (5) 
Friends 
(6) 
Adversaries 
   From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.58 -0.44  -0.11 -0.02  0.69 -0.42 
 (0.06)** (0.05)**  (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.05)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.21 -0.27  0.16 -0.06  0.04 -0.21 
 (0.12) (0.11)*  (0.08)* (0.04)  (0.11) (0.10)* 
Roma -0.10 0.10  0.50 -0.15  -0.59 0.25 
 (0.12) (0.10)  (0.10)** (0.05)**  (0.12)** (0.08)** 
Class FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. The number of friendship and adversary nominations from all peers, as well as 
from Roma and non-Roma peers separately, as functions of GPA and ethnicity of the 
student. Peers are same-sex classmates. GPA is publicly observable grade point average 
ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be zero at its mean value 3.5. Standard errors, 
clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
The results are in line with the conclusions of Figure 1 and Figure 2. According to 
columns 1 and 2, non-Roma students with a one point higher GPA receive 0.6 more 
friendship nominations and 0.4 fewer adversary nominations on average from their 
peers ( 1  in columns 1 and 2). Roma students with a one point higher GPA receive 0.8 
more friendship nominations and 0.7 fewer adversary nominations on average from their 
peers ( 1 2   in columns 1 and 2). The association with GPA is statistically significantly 
stronger among Roma students than non-Roma students in terms of adversaries but not 
in terms of friends. 
Columns 3 to 6 show that the relationships observed are almost exclusively due to 
differential nominations from non-Roma peers, again in line with the conclusions of 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. Roma students with different GPA have the same number of Roma 
friends and adversaries on average ( 1 2   in columns 3 and 4). In contrast, their 
relations with non-Roma peers are strongly related to their GPA: Roma students with a 
one-point higher GPA have 0.7 more non-Roma friends and 0.6 fewer non-Roma 
adversaries on average ( 1 2   in columns 3 and 4). The friendship relationships among 
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the non-Roma students are similarly related to their GPA, but the adversary 
relationships are less strongly related to GPA (0.4 fewer non-Roma adversaries of non-
Roma students if their GPA is higher by one point).  
The coefficients on the Roma variable ( 3 ) reveal the average differences in the 
nominations received by Roma students versus non-Roma students with the same GPA, 
fixed at 3.5. Note that 3.5 is the 40th percentile among non-Roma students and the 80th 
percentile among Roma students. Roma and non-Roma students with a GPA of 3.5 have 
approximately the same number of friends and adversaries overall ( 3  in columns 1 and 
2), but the composition differs by ethnicity: approximately 0.5 more friends and 0.2 
fewer adversaries from the same ethnic group than from the opposite ethnic group (the 
differences in 3  between columns 3 vs. 5 and 4 vs. 6 are statistically not significant). 
These results suggest a bias toward favoring peers from one’s own ethnic group over 
peers from the other ethnic group, a phenomenon known as inbreeding homophily in 
network science. In relation to peers with a GPA of 3.5, the bias is similar in the two 
ethnic groups.  
4.2 Robustness checks 
The results are remarkably robust in many different specifications (Table C3 
through Table C21 in S3 Appendix show these results). The estimated associations are 
very similar in regressions without the class fixed effects, with class–gender fixed effects 
instead of class fixed effects, restricting the sample to those who have not repeated 
grades, restricting the sample to the common support in ethnic composition (two or 
more same-sex classmates in both ethnic groups), and if we include covariates (grade 
retention, age, gender, parental education, and number of years spent in preschool). The 
results are robust to the cap on nominations in the data: we obtain very similar estimates 
if we impose a cap of four names instead of five. The estimates are similar if we use 
alternative measures of the relationships, including the popularity measure developed by 
Echenique and Fryer (2007). Remarkably, the results are also very similar if we replace 
nominations from same-sex classmates with nominations from opposite-sex classmates 
as the left-hand side variables. The associations are also robust for students who 
identified as Roma in the 1st place and those who identified as Roma in the 2nd place. 
There is some heterogeneity by gender: the associations with GPA are somewhat 
stronger for male Roma students than for female Roma students, and the difference is 
the opposite among non-Roma students. When we estimate the associations separately 
for the top and the bottom half of the distribution of peer groups by their average GPA 
we find very similar results again. Finally, the associations are very similar in towns that 
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are characterized by low anti-Roma prejudice and high prejudice (proxied by the fraction 
of votes casted on the far right party Jobbik with explicit anti-Roma platform in the 
general elections of 2010).  
Additional regression results (Table C22, S3 Appendix) reveal that there is 
virtually no association between achievement and contacts among non-Roma students of 
lower social status, in stark contrast to what we have shown for Roma students. (We 
approximate low status is measured by whether the mother has 8 grades of education or 
less; 18% of non-Roma students have such mothers).  
4.3 Results supporting causal interpretation 
The robustness of the association of GPA with friendship and hostility relations is 
remarkable. It suggests that the associations may be in fact causal effects. However, 
causality could run both ways: better achievement resulting in more non-Roma friends 
or more non-Roma friends resulting in better achievement. To shed some light on this 
question we entered GPA together with scores from low-stakes tests in our regressions. 
As we indicated in the Data section above, GPA is publicly observable in Hungarian 
schools as grades are typically discussed in front of the whole class, while test scores are 
publicly, and often privately, unobserved. If causality runs from social relations to 
performance we would expect them to show up in both measures of achievement, 
resulting in nonzero coefficients for both. In contrast, if causality runs from achievement 
to relations public observability is likely to be important, and we would expect the 
coefficients on GPA to be the same as before while the coefficients on test scores to be 
zero. Our results are exactly these latter ones: when both are entered the coefficient on 
GPA retains its original magnitude while the coefficient on test scores is statistically zero 
in all regressions (Table 3). While in principle this may simply reflect that test scores are 
too noisy to contain any information conditional on GPA, we show that that is unlikely to 
be the case. We examine analogous regressions with subsequent outcome measures on 
the left-hand-side: admission to academic secondary school, dropping out of secondary 
school, GPA and test scores in grade 10 (Table 4). Test scores are statistically significant 
in all of these regressions, with coefficient magnitudes ranging from one quarter of that 
of GPA (admission, dropping out, GPA) to three times as large (future test scores).  
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Table 3.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA as well as the average of the 
standardized test scores in mathematics and reading. 
Dep. variable: # 
nominations 
from peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.49 -0.37 -0.11 -0.01  0.61 -0.35 
 (0.08)** (0.07)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.07)** (0.06)** 
Test score 0.08 -0.09 0.01 -0.01  0.07 -0.08 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.07) 
Roma × GPA 0.20 -0.22 0.15 -0.00  0.04 -0.22 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.09) (0.04)  (0.14) (0.11) 
Roma × test 
score 
0.02 -0.13 -0.04 -0.09  0.07 -0.04 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05)  (0.13) (0.10) 
Roma -0.03 0.05 0.49 -0.17  -0.53 0.22 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)** (0.05)**  (0.13)** (0.10)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,154 3,154 3,154 3,154  3,154 3,154 
Notes. Dependent variable: The number of friendship and adversary nominations from 
all peers as well as from Roma and non-Roma peers separately. Peers are same-sex 
classmates. Main right-hand-side variables: GPA (publicly observable) and standardized 
scores of low-stakes test in mathematics and reading (the simple average of the two 
scores; results of this test are typically unobservable to the students). 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table 4.  
Subsequent academic outcomes as function of GPA as well as the average of 
the standardized test scores in mathematics and reading. 
Dependent 
variable: future 
academic 
outcomes 
Admission to 
academic 
secondary school  
Dropout from 
secondary 
school 
GPA in 
grade 10 
Standardized test 
score in grade 10 
reading math 
GPA 0.24 -0.08 0.76 0.28 0.19 
 (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.03)** 
Test score 0.06 -0.02 0.19 0.75 0.74 
(0.01)** (0.01)* (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.03)** 
Roma × GPA -0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03)** (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Roma × test score -0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.11 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Roma 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.17 
 (0.03) (0.02)* (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3,154 3,154 3,154 3,154 3,154 
Notes. Dependent variables: whether admitted to academic secondary school 
(“gimnazium”) after grade 8; whether dropped out of secondary school by the end of 
grade 10; GPA (1 through 5) at mid-year in grade 10; standardized (0,1) scores of low-
stakes tests in reading and mathematics at the end of grade 10. Main right-hand-side 
variables: see Table C23. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Taken together, our results indicate that Roma students can gain more non-
Roma friends without losing Roma friends if they perform better in school, and they can 
decrease hostility by non-Roma students without inducing hostility by their Roma peers. 
These results contradict the notion of the detrimental effects of “acting white” in the 
context of Hungarian schools. Instead of being punished for their better achievement, 
eighth-grade Roma students in Hungary are rewarded by the majority ethnic group and 
keep their social status in their own ethnic group at the same time. 
5. Results: the interaction of achievement and exposure 
Having established the robust role of academic achievement of Roma students in inter-
ethnic relations we turn to how that interacts with the composition of students’ peer 
groups in affecting interethnic relations. We examine this question both from the 
viewpoint of Roma students and non-Roma students. The first question: How does 
exposure to non-Roma classmates translate into friends and adversaries for Roma 
students, depending on their achievement? The second: How does exposure to Roma 
classmates translate into non-Roma students having a Roma friend or adversary, 
depending on whether those classmates are of high achievement or low achievement? 
5.1 Friends and adversaries of Roma students and the ethnic composition of their peer 
groups 
Figure 3 shows the non-parametric regression results with the average number of friends 
and adversaries of high-achieving Roma students and low-achieving Roma students as 
the function of the proportion of Roma students in their peer group. We define high 
achievement as having a GPA of 3.5; 60 percent of the non-Roma students are high 
achievers, compared to 20 percent of Roma students.  
21 
 
Figure 3.  
Friends and adversaries of Roma students and the ethnic composition  
of their peer group 
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(A) Friends of Roma students (B) Adversaries of Roma students 
Notes: Peer group is defined as same-sex classmates 
 
Similarly to the previous section, friends and adversaries are defined as 
nominations received from same-sex classmates. The proportion of Roma students in the 
peer group of Roma students is aggregated to categories (increments of 0.1 up to 0.4 and 
0.2 above), and this proportion does not include the Roma student himself or herself. 
More Roma peers translates to more friends and fewer adversaries overall for 
low-achieving Roma students, but this relation is weak and statistically not significant 
among high-achieving Roma students. If 0-10% in their peer group is Roma, high-
achieving Roma students have 3.7 friends and 0.9 adversary on average, while low-
achieving Roma students have 2.1 friends and 2.2 adversaries on average. If, instead, 30-
40% of their peer group is Roma, high-achieving Roma students have slightly more 
friends and the same number of adversaries on average (4.4 and 1.0), while low-
achieving Roma students have significantly more friends and fewer adversaries (3.6 and 
1.7). Table C23 and Table C24 in S3 Appendix show the corresponding regressions where 
the nonlinearities are captured by quadratic terms. The main coefficients of interest are 
the interactions terms. The estimates imply the same conclusion as the nonparametric 
figures above: the friends and adversaries Roma students have is substantially less 
related to the ethnic composition of their class if they are high-achievers. The results 
with and without individual covariates, as well as with and without class fixed-effects are 
very similar. The coefficients in the regressions with class fixed-effects are identified 
from within-class differences in the ethnic composition of girls versus boys, as peer 
groups are defined by gender. These results control for all observed and unobserved 
differences between classes that may affect relationships and the composition of peer 
groups at the same time, such as ability tracking or preferences of parents or teachers for 
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ethnic mixing. Figure C6 in S3 Appendix shows that the associations are very similar if 
the number of potential nominations is capped at four. Figure C7 in S3 Appendix shows 
the corresponding nonparametric regressions for opposite-sex relations. The results are 
weaker here for friendship but are just as strong for adversaries.  
Importantly, the difference between high-achieving Roma students and low-
achieving Roma students in how the ethnic composition of their peer groups translate 
into friends and adversaries overall is entirely due to the difference in their non-Roma 
relationships. Figure 4 shows the relationships with the number of Roma and non-Roma 
friends and adversaries separately. The association of class composition with Roma 
friends and adversaries are the same for high- and low-achieving Roma students (Panel 
A and B). In contrast, the association for non-Roma friends is stronger for high-
achieving Roma students, while association with the number of non-Roma adversaries is 
weaker for them (Panel C and D). 
Figure 4.  
Roma and non-Roma friends and adversaries of Roma students  
by the fraction of Roma students in their peer group 
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(A) Roma friends (B) Roma adversaries 
0
1
2
3
4
5
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
fr
ie
n
d
s
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Fraction Roma in peer group
High-achieving Roma student Low-achieving Roma student
95% CI 95% CI
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
a
d
v
e
rs
a
ri
e
s
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Fraction Roma in peer group
High-achieving Roma student Low-achieving Roma student
95% CI 95% CI
 
(C) Non-Roma friends (D) Non-Roma adversaries 
Notes: Peer group is defined as same-sex classmates 
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Taken together, we can conclude that desegregation (reducing the proportion of 
Roma students in the peer group) would decrease the number of Roma friends. At the 
same time, it would increase the number of non-Roma friends. This substitution is 
strong for high-achieving Roma students so much that the ethnic composition of their 
peer group is very weakly related to the number of their friends and adversaries. It is 
weak for low-achieving Roma students: they do not gain enough non-Roma friends but 
obtain more adversaries thus leading to significantly fewer friends and more adversaries 
when fewer of their peers are Roma. 
5.2 Roma friends and adversaries of non-Roma students and the exposure to Roma 
classmates 
The second question in this section examines the propensity of non-Roma students to 
nominate Roma students as friends or adversaries. The question is the extent to which 
higher exposure to Roma classmates translates in to more relationships, and whether the 
achievement of the Roma peer group matters for that.  
Figure 5.  
Roma friends and adversaries of non-Roma students as a function of the 
fraction of low-GPA Roma students (dashed lines) or the fraction of high-
GPA Roma students (solid lines) 
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(A) Has a Roma friend (B) Has a Roma adversary 
Notes: The percentage of non-Roma students nominating Roma students as a friend and 
as an adversary as a function of the fraction of low-GPA Roma students (dashed lines) or 
the fraction of high-GPA Roma students (solid lines). Both fractions are aggregated to 
categories. Variance of the estimates computed as p(1-p)/#schools). 
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Panel A of Figure 5 shows the percentage of non-Roma students who nominate at 
least one Roma student as a friend as a function of the proportion of low-achieving Roma 
students in her or his peer group, and separately as a function of the proportion of high-
achieving Roma students (the achievement cutoff is a GPA of 3.5, as before). Panel B 
shows the corresponding figures for whether non-Roma students nominate a Roma 
student as an adversary. The figures are created by aggregating the data to categories of 
the proportion of low-achieving and high-achieving Roma students, and the domain of 
the latter is narrower and does not go above 50 percent.  
Exposure to Roma classmates translates into more non-Roma students to have a 
Roma friend, but this is more so if those Roma classmates are of high achievement. 
While exposure translates into more non-Roma students to have Roma adversaries, too, 
this less so if those Roma classmates are of high achievement. These are the conclusions 
from the nonparametric regression graphs: The regression line is significantly steeper for 
friendship with respect to the proportion of high-achieving Roma students, while it is 
significantly flatter for adversaries.  
Linear probability model estimates give very similar results (Table C25, S3 
Appendix). The regressions include the proportion of low-achieving Roma students in 
the peer group together with the proportion of high-achieving Roma students in the peer 
group, both in a quadratic specification. The association between the probability of 
nominating a Roma friend and the proportion of low-achieving Roma students in the 
peer group is positive, but the association with the proportion of high-achieving Roma 
students is twice as strong (the additional slope diminishes and levels off at 50 percent, 
the maximum in the sample). Nominating a Roma adversary is also positively associated 
with the proportion of low-achieving Roma students, but there is no association with the 
proportion of high-achieving Roma students. The results are robust to including class 
fixed-effects, if we cap maximum nominations at four (Figure C8, S3 Appendix), but 
there is virtually no difference in the likelihood of nominating an opposite-sex Roma 
student as a friend or an adversary based on the achievement level of the group (Figure 
C9, S3 Appendix). 
Our results lead to conclusions that are similar to those obtained by Carrell, 
Hoekstra, and West (2015). They find that when white students in the U.S. Air Force 
Academy spend a year with high-achieving African American students in the same 
squadron (based on random assignment), they are more likely to choose an African 
American student as a roommate in the following year than if they spent that year with 
lower-achieving African American students. Hence, students from an otherwise 
prejudiced majority appear to reduce their social distance from a disadvantaged racial or 
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ethnic minority if they are exposed to high-achieving members of the minority for a long 
time in a relatively intimate setting.  
6. Discussion: policy simulation  
To appreciate the consequences of our findings for educational policy we use the results 
to simulate the effects of two policy experiments. The first experiment is complete ethnic 
desegregation: achieving uniform ethnic distribution across classes in the entire country. 
The second experiment is closing the achievement gap: increasing the proportion of 
high-achieving Roma students to the non-Roma level. We are interested in how the two 
experiments separately, or combined, affect the number and ethnic composition of 
friends and adversaries of Roma students, and how they affect the likelihood that non-
Roma students nominate at least one Roma student as a friend or an adversary. These 
experiments represent extreme outcomes of policies that aim at increasing inter-ethnic 
exposure in schools and improving academic achievement of disadvantaged students. 
The details of the simulation exercise are presented in S2 Appendix. First, we 
make use of various additional data sources to simulate the national distribution of 
eighth-grade classes by gender, ethnicity, and achievement. Second, we estimate the 
expected number of friends and adversaries in each class–gender–ethnicity group using 
the simulated distribution and our estimates from the previous two sections. These 
class–gender–ethnicity level estimates are then used to estimate national averages for 
the number of friends and adversaries by ethnicity. Finally, we repeat the exercise for the 
two hypothetical changes in the distribution: (i) equal ethnic distribution and (ii) an 
increased proportion of high-achieving students among Roma students to the non-Roma 
level. Importantly, we pay attention to indivisibility issues and the fact that with only a 
few Roma students in a class, their distribution across same-gender peer groups may be 
different. 
The simulated national distributions suggest that 46 percent of non-Roma 
students and 37 percent of Roma students have zero Roma in their peer group. The 
majority of the peer group is Roma for only 2 percent of the non-Roma students and 13 
percent of the Roma students. Equalized distribution of Roma students across classes 
leads to only 27 percent of non-Roma students and 69 percent of Roma students having 
zero Roma in their peer group. 
Table 5 shows the simulated effects of the policy changes on the number of 
friends and adversaries of an average Roma student. At baseline, Roma students have 3.1 
friends and 1.4 adversaries on average, constituted by having 1 Roma friend, 2.1 non-
Roma friends, 0.1 Roma adversaries, and 1.3 non-Roma adversaries. The effects of an 
equalized ethnic distribution would be negative on the total numbers: 0.3 fewer friends 
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and 0.3 more adversaries. These are the results of 0.8 fewer Roma friends not fully 
compensated by the increased number of non-Roma friends, and 0.4 more non-Roma 
adversaries not fully compensated by the decreased number of Roma adversaries. In 
contrast, closing the achievement gap would result in positive effects only: 0.4 more 
friends and 0.3 fewer adversaries, resulting from no changes in the relations with Roma 
peers and improved relations with non-Roma peers. When the two policies are 
combined, the effects of closing the achievement gap would dominate for the total 
numbers, but this would be accompanied by a substantial redistribution of the ethnic 
composition of friends and adversaries due to equalized exposure to the other ethnic 
group. 
Table 5.  
Friends and adversaries of Roma students: the simulated effect of equal 
ethnic distribution and closing the achievement gap 
  The number of 
  Friends Adversaries   
Roma 
Friends 
Roma 
Adversaries 
  
Non-
Roma 
Friends 
Non-Roma 
Adversaries 
Benchmark 
estimates  
3.1 1.4 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.1 1.3 
Simulated change under alternative scenarios 
Effect of 
equalized 
distribution 
-0.3 0.3 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.5 0.4 
Effect of closing 
the achievement 
gap 
0.4 -0.3 
 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.4 -0.3 
Effect of both 0.2 -0.1   -0.8 -0.1   1.0 0.0 
Notes. Results of the simulation exercise. See details in S2 Appendix. 
 
Table 6 shows that under the current distributions, 18 percent of the non-Roma 
students have at least one Roma friend and 14 percent have at least one Roma adversary. 
Equal ethnic distribution leads to an increase in both, but a substantially larger increase 
in those with a Roma friend, to 26 and 15 percent, respectively. Closing the achievement 
gap in itself leads to a similar increase in the percentage of non-Roma students with a 
Roma friend, to 25 percent, and a substantial decrease in those with a Roma adversary, 
to 5 percent. The two policies combined would result in a striking increase in friendship 
nomination and a small decrease in adversary nomination, to 32 and 10 percent, 
respectively. 
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Table 6.  
The percentage of non-Roma students with at least one Roma  
friend or adversary 
  Percentage who have at least one 
  Roma friend Roma adversary 
Benchmark estimates 18 14 
Simulated change under alternative scenarios 
Effect of equal distribution 26 15 
Effect of closing the achievement gap 25 5 
Effect of both 32 10 
Notes. Results of the simulation exercise. Friends and adversaries are defined as 
nominations extended by non-Roma students. See details in S2 Appendix. 
 
The results of the simulation exercise suggest that equalizing the ethnic 
distribution of classes would lead to a major interethnic redistribution of the friendship 
and hostility relations of Roma students. It would also lead to a moderate deterioration 
in their situation in terms of overall number of friends and adversaries. The increase in 
the proportion of non-Roma students having a Roma friend is moderate, but it comes at 
the cost of a slight increase in the proportion having a Roma adversary. Closing the 
achievement gap would lead to an improvement in the friendship and adversary relations 
of Roma students without major shifts in their ethnic composition. It would also lead to 
an increase in the percentage of non-Roma students with Roma friends and a decrease in 
the number having Roma adversaries.  
When equalizing the ethnic distribution is combined with closing the 
achievement gap, the relations of Roma students show improvements together with 
major shifts in the ethnic composition of their friends and adversaries. In addition, the 
proportion of non-Roma students with a Roma friend would increase compared to the 
baseline percentage, and the percentage with a Roma adversary would decrease. The 
magnitudes implied by our simulation exercise are significant. For example, when 
combined, the policies considered have the potential to increase the number of non-
Roma students with Roma friends by 80 percent, although they would still be a minority 
among all non-Roma students (32 percent). The same combination of policies can lead to 
even more substantial shifts in the ethnic composition of friends of Roma students.  
Of course, the actual effects of large policy changes may be very different from 
our simulation results. The changes may lead to interethnic dynamics that undermine 
some or even most of the positive effects, similar Carrell, Sacerdote, and West’s (2013) 
findings in their policy experiment. Alternatively, these policies may contribute to 
lowering the overall level of prejudice, which could have additional positive effects. 
Nevertheless, our results suggest that educational policies can improve interethnic 
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relations if they achieve both a more equal ethnic distribution across classes and a 
narrower achievement gap between minority and majority students. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper provides strong evidence that high-achieving eighth-grade students from the 
disadvantaged Roma minority in Hungary have significantly more friends and fewer 
adversaries than low-achieving ones. It also shows that the ethnic composition of their 
class is strongly related to how many friends and adversaries low-achieving Roma 
students have: with fewer Roma classmates they have fewer Roma friends that is not 
compensated by more non-Roma friends. However, the same is not true for high-
achieving Roma students: with fewer Roma classmates they have fewer Roma friends, 
but it is fully compensated by having more non-Roma friends. Finally, we showed that 
higher exposure to low-achieving Roma students implies that more non-Roma students 
have Roma contacts (friends and adversaries). But exposure to more high-achieving 
Roma students is more beneficial: twice as many non-Roma students have Roma friends, 
without more of them having Roma adversaries. 
We can draw three conclusions from these results. First, they provide support to 
the contact hypothesis. Contact with members of a disadvantaged minority translates 
into positive inter-group relationships, and this association is substantially stronger if 
there is little difference in the social status of the two groups (here their academic 
achievement). In addition, they show that contact is substantially less likely to translate 
into adversary relationships if status is more similar. These results are established in an 
environment with high levels of open prejudice against the disadvantaged minority. 
Second, the results suggest that rejection from Roma peers due to “acting white” 
by having higher achievement is unlikely to be a major issue for most Roma students in 
Hungarian schools. On the contrary, Roma students with higher academic achievement 
have more non-Roma friends and fewer non-Roma adversaries, without having fewer 
Roma friends or more Roma adversaries. 
Third, they have important conclusions for educational policy. Minority students 
can benefit from educational methods that help them succeed in schools, not only in the 
long term but also in the short term. Educational policy may leverage this extra incentive 
when aiming to close the achievement gap between minorities and the majority. Indeed, 
our simulation results suggest that a policy that combines desegregation and closing the 
achievement gap can improve the social relations of minority students both in terms of 
having more friends and having more of their friends from the majority. While 
desegregation, in itself, increases the hostility they face, also closing the achievement gap 
would counter-balance that, leading to better social status along all dimensions. This 
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combined policy has the highest potential to result in more of the majority students 
having minority friends. 
Tensions along ethnic and racial lines have been strong in many countries, and 
may have become stronger in recent years. The social integration of disadvantaged 
minorities is as important a social goal as ever: it improves the lives of minorities and 
reduces social tensions at the same time. Our finding suggests that educational policies 
promote this goal if they increase ethnic diversity in classrooms and help the academic 
development of minority students. 
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S1 Appendix: Data documentation 
The data for our analysis comes from the “Interetnikus kapcsolatok” (Inter-ethnic 
relations) survey. The survey was designed by the authors of this paper and it was 
financed by the Educatio Kht, Hungary. The data was collected by the Adatgyujto Intezet, 
Hungary, in the spring of 2010. 
The target population of the survey was the eighth grade students in the towns and cities 
of Hungary who studied in schools with at least 10 percent and at most 90 percent Roma 
students. The sampling frame was selected from the set of schools in the National 
Assessment of Basic Competencies, the nationwide student testing framework that 
includes administrative data on schools as well. Among other information, this data 
contains school principals’ estimates of the proportion of Roma students in their schools. 
We used the average of this information from 2006, 2007 and 2008 to select the schools 
in the 10 percent to 90 percent range. The final sampling frame consisted of 354 schools 
that were located in towns and cities (except Budapest) so we excluded all village schools.  
The sample was stratified random sample of 88 schools in 74 towns and cities. The strata 
were based on the proportion of Roma students and the schools’ participation in an 
integrated education framework program implemented by the Hungarian government 
(“IPR program”); this latter information was not used in our analysis. The geographic 
distribution of the sample was not restricted or stratified. As there were few schools with 
high proportion of Roma students we used higher sampling weights for such schools to 
obtain more even distribution in the sample. Figure A1 shows the histogram of the 
proportion of Roma students; panel A shows the distribution in the sampling frame, 
while panel B shows the distribution in the sample. 
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Figure A1.  
Distribution of the schools by the proportion of Roma students 
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(A) Distribution in the sampling frame (n=354) (B) Distribution in the sample (n=88) 
 
All students in grade 8 in the 88 selected schools were part of the data collection. The 
data was collected in classrooms. The main instrument was a student questionnaire with 
the lists of friends and adversaries and some background information. The names of all 
students in the class were written on the blackboard, and students were asked to list the 
names of their five best male friends, their best five female friends (with some 
information that help assess the intensity of their friendship) and five classmates with 
whom they would not share a train cabin during a field trip. Students who were absent 
on the day of the data collection did not fill out this questionnaire but their names were 
listed on the blackboard, too. The background information included the ethnic identity of 
the students, asked in the form of two questions (What is your national or ethnic identity 
in the first place? What is your national or ethnic identity in the second place?) 
Schoolteachers were asked to provide grades and some additional information on a 
separate questionnaire. The school administration was then asked to assign the student 
identifiers to each name, and the names were removed from the questionnaires before 
they were collected by the data collection agency. Our data collection took place a few 
weeks before the testing day. We used these identifiers to merge administrative data on 
test scores once those scores became available. This data collection and the 
appropriateness of the measures taken to ensure privacy were approved by the Oktatasi 
Hivatal (Educational Agency, the governmental organization responsible for the testing).
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S2 Appendix: Documenting the simulation exercise 
The simulation exercise consists of three steps: (1) creating a simulated population of 8th 
grade students of different ethnicity (Roma or non-Roma) and achievement category 
(high-achiever or low-achiever) estimated from a representative survey; (2) creating 
classes and peer groups within classes in this simulated population and simulating the 
ethnic composition of the peer group for each student, using administrative data on the 
ethnic composition of schools and representative survey data on the ethnic composition 
of classes within schools; (3) simulating the number of friends, by ethnicity, using 
estimates from our main analysis. The benchmark results of this exercise are our 
estimates of the friendship and hostility relations in the entire population. The purpose 
of this exercise is to compare its estimates to estimates under three alternative scenarios: 
(i) equal ethnic distribution of classes; (ii) closing the achievement gap between Roma 
and non-Roma students; (iii) the two together: equal ethnic distribution and no gap. 
These alternative estimates are based on the same simulation exercises with appropriate 
changes in the composition of peer groups and students’ achievements. 
Step 1. The population of 8th grade students  
Source: Hungarian Life Course Survey (HLCS; the “Eletpalya” survey of TARKI). First 
survey wave, 10,022 adolescents interviewed in the fall after they finished 8th grade. 
Ethnicity 
Individuals are considered Roma if  
 they identified as Roma in any of the survey waves (asked in 4 out of 6 
survey waves), 
 any of their parents identified themselves as Roma in any of the survey 
waves (asked in 2 out of 6 survey waves), or 
 any of their parents identified their parents or other ancestors as Roma in 
any of the survey waves (asked in 2 out of 6 survey waves). 
There are 1320 Roma individuals defined this way is in the sample; they fraction, using 
the appropriate sampling weights is 11% (using weight is necessary as low-achieving 
students were oversampled in the survey, resulting in an oversampling Roma students). 
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Achievement 
Information on the grade point average (GPA) at the end of the 1st semester of 8th grade 
(the same point in time it is measured in the IEFH survey) is available in the 
administrative National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) dataset. We linked 
this information to each student in the HLCS sample (the sampling frame of the HLCS 
sample was the NABC administrative data). 
This measure of GPA was missing for 1373 observations. We filled the missing values by 
predictions from a regression of GPA on Roma and piecewise linear splines of the 
reading and mathematics test scores (test scores were available for all students in the 
sample as the administrative test score data formed the frame of the sample). 
High-achieving students were defined as having a GPA of 3.5 or higher. 
Expanding the sample to the simulated population 
The HLCS represents the student population using its sampling weights (see earlier 
about the weights). These weights vary from 0.2 to 42.5 (mean is 10.9). We used the 
rounded integer values of the sampling weights of the HLCS survey (replaced it to 1 for 
the 124 observations for which the sampling weights were below 0.5). This resulted in a 
dataset of the simulated population of 8th grade students, n=109,119. This number is 
approximately the number of 8th grade students in the administrative data on test scores; 
the small difference is due to rounding errors. 
Step 2. The ethnic composition of the peer group  
Ethnic composition of the class 
Two sources of information are used to estimate the estimate the ethnic composition of 
the 8th grade class of the individuals in the HLCS sample.  
 The first wave of the HLCS as a categorical variable on students’ assessment of 
the composition of their class in 8th grade. We transformed the categories to 
estimated fractions (0.05 if “no or very few Roma”, 0.2 if “some Roma but less 
than half”, 0.5 if “half Roma”, 0.7 if “majority but not all Roma” and 1 if “all or 
almost all Roma”).  
 The school-level file of the NABC contains the school principals’ estimates of the 
fraction or Roma students in the entire school.  
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 The first measure was missing for 138 of the 10,022 observations; the second 
measure was missing for 1,174 of the 10,022 observations; the two were jointly 
missing for 23 observations; those were dropped from the analysis. 
We combined the two sources of information in the following way. We first took the 
average of the two measures (only one measure when the other one was missing). We 
then replaced the estimated fraction Roma to zero if the school-level estimate was less 
than 2 percent, and we replaced it to one if the school-level estimated was greater than 
90 percent. 
Ethnic composition of the peer group 
The peer group is defined as same-sex classmates. We have information on the size of the 
8th-grade class for each individual (from the linked administrative NABC database) but 
we have no complete information on the gender composition of the classes. We assumed 
that exactly half of each class is female. For each student the size of the peer group is the 
rounded integer of the half of the class minus one. For each student the number of Roma 
students in her or his peer group is the size of the peer group multiplied with the fraction 
Roma in the class and rounded to the nearest integer. For Roma students the number of 
Roma in their peer group is one minus this number. When this estimate turned out to be 
negative we replaced it by zero. The fraction of Roma in one’s peer group is the ratio of 
these two numbers: the estimated number of Roma students in the peer group divided by 
the estimated size of the peer group. 
Figure B1 shows the simulated fraction of Roma students in the peer groups or Roma 
students and non-Roma students. 46 percent of non-Roma students and 37 percent of 
Roma students have zero Roma in their peer group. The average fraction of Roma 
students in the peer group of non-Roma students is 9 percent, and the average fraction of 
Roma students in the peer group of Roma students is 21 percent. 
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Figure B1.  
Simulated distribution of students’ exposure to Roma peers (Benchmark case) 
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Step 3. The estimated number of friends and adversaries 
We estimated the number of friends and adversaries Roma students receive, also by the 
ethnicity of the nominating peer, and the number of Roma friends and adversaries non-
Roma students nominate. 
Estimation 
The estimation procedure is the same as the one outlined in Section 5 of the main text: 
We created categories by the fraction of Roma in the peer group using increments of 0.1 
up to 0.4 and 0.2 above. We then estimated the average number of friends and 
adversaries Roma students receive in those categories, separately for high-GPA Roma 
students and low-GPA Roma students. For the number of Roma peers nominated by 
non-Roma we created similar categories separately of the fraction of high-GPA Roma 
students and low-GPA Roma students and estimated the average number of peers non-
Roma students nominate in the two-dimensional distribution of these categorical 
variables. We replaced the number of friends to 0 when the size of the appropriate peer 
group was 0.  
Importing estimates to the simulated data 
We used the first set of estimates to predict the number of friends and adversaries Roma 
students receive, by the GPA of the Roma student and fraction Roma in her or his peer 
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group. We used the second set of estimates to predict the number of Roma friends and 
adversaries non-Roma students nominate by the two-dimensional distribution spanned 
by the categories of the fraction of high-GPA Roma students and low-GPA Roma 
students in the peer group. 
Benchmark 
Steps 1 through 3 provide the estimated number of friends and adversaries of Roma 
students under the current distribution of academic achievement and the ethnic 
composition of classes. These estimates for the benchmark to our policy simulations. 
Policy simulation 1: Equal ethnic distribution of students 
In this exercise we simulate the effect of equalizing the ethnic composition of classes 
across the nation. We simulate the fraction of Roma students in the peer groups of each 
student in the population first. We start with replacing the fraction of Roma students in 
each class from the benchmark estimates to 11 percent. In a typical class that would 
imply exactly two Roma students. Simply projecting this 11 percent fraction to each class-
gender group would amount to assume that of those two Roma students one is always a 
girl and one is a boy. Instead, a complete random allocation would result in a same-sex 
Roma students in only 50 percent of the cases. We implement this second assumption in 
our simulation exercise by allocating zero Roma peers to a random one quarter of class-
gender groups and two peers to another quarter. 
Then we see the number of Roma students this fraction would imply in each group 
defined by class and gender by rounding the implied number to the nearest integer. Then 
we create the fraction of Roma students in the peer group of each student, defining the 
size of the peer group and the number of Roma peers the way we did in Step 2 above 
(making sure we don’t double count Roma students). This procedure incorporates the 
inherent indivisibility of peer groups that can result to zero Roma peers to many people.  
Figure B2 shows the simulated fraction of Roma students in the peer groups or Roma 
students and non-Roma students in this scenario. Now only 27 percent of non-Roma 
students have zero Roma students in their peer group, and 69 percent of the Roma 
students have no Roma peer. The average number of Roma students in the peer group of 
non-Roma students is now 11 percent, while the average number of Roma students in the 
peer group of Roma students is 0.5 percent. 
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Figure B2.  
Simulated distribution of students’ exposure to Roma peers  
(Equal ethnic composition of classes) 
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Table B1.  
Number of friends and adversaries of Roma students in the benchmark 
simulation and the simulated effect of equal ethnic distribution 
  Number of   Number of   Number of 
  Friends Adversaries   
Roma 
Friends 
Roma 
Adversaries 
  
Non-
Roma 
Friends 
Non-Roma 
Adversaries 
(A) Friends and adversaries of low-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 2.7 1.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.7 1.6 
Equal 
distribution 
2.2 2.1 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
2.1 2.1 
Equal - 
Benchmark 
-0.5 0.4 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.4 0.5 
(B) Friends and adversaries of high-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 3.8 0.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.8 0.6 
Equal 
distribution 
3.7 0.9 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
3.6 0.9 
Equal – 
Benchmark 
-0.1 0.1 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.7 0.2 
(C) Friends and adversaries of an average Roma student 
Benchmark 3.1 1.4 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.1 1.3 
Equal 
distribution 
2.8 1.7 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
2.6 1.7 
Equal - 
Benchmark 
-0.3 0.3   -0.8 -0.1   0.5 0.4 
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Applying the non-parametric regression estimates of the implied number of friends and 
adversaries to this simulated distribution of peer group composition we receive the 
following results. Table B1 shows the simulated number of friends and adversaries of 
Roma students. Table B2 shows the simulated percent of non-Roma students with at 
least one Roma friend and the percent with at least one Roma adversary. 
Table B2.  
The simulated percent of non-Roma students with Roma  
friends and adversaries 
  Percent who have at least one 
  Roma friend Roma adversary 
Benchmark estimates 18 14 
Equal ethnic distribution 26 15 
 
The benchmark results are in line with our previous results from, with slightly different 
levels. These differences are due to the fact that the sample used for our main analysis is 
not representative of the entire population of 8th grade students in Hungary by design.  
Policy simulation 2: Closing the achievement gap 
In the benchmark simulated dataset 69 percent of the non-Roma students and only 34 
percent of the Roma students have high GPA (a GPA of 3.5 or more; maximum is 5.0). In 
this simulation exercise we increased the GPA of Roma students between 3.0 and 3.5 to 
above 3.5. The fraction of high-GPA students in this exercise increased from 34 percent 
to 67 percent. 
Table B3 shows the estimated number of friends and adversaries of Roma students in 
this case with the simulated ethnic distribution of peers and under the scenario of closing 
the achievement gap. Table B4 shows the simulated percent of non-Roma students with 
at least one Roma friend and the percent with at least one Roma adversary. 
The number of friends and adversaries of low-achieving Roma students and high-
achieving Roma students is the same in this exercise as in the benchmark case. The 
difference is in the number of friends and adversaries of the average Roma student: 
these are a lot closer to the high-achieving numbers because this average student is now 
more likely to have high achievement. The percent of non-Roma students with Roma 
friends in this experiment is very similar to the previous experiment (25 percent versus 
26 percent), but the percent with Roma adversaries is reduced substantially, to 5 percent. 
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Table B3.  
The number of friends and adversaries of Roma students in the benchmark 
scenario and the simulated scenario of closing the achievement gap 
  Number of   Number of   Number of 
  Friends Adversaries   
Roma 
Friends 
Roma 
Adversaries 
  
Non-
Roma 
Friends 
Non-Roma 
Adversaries 
(A) Friends and adversaries of low-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 2.7 1.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.7 1.6 
Closed gap 2.8 1.7 
 
1.1 0.2 
 
1.6 1.5 
Closed gap - 
Benchmark 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.1 0.0 
 
0.0 -0.1 
(B) Friends and adversaries of high-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 3.8 0.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.8 0.6 
Closed gap 3.8 0.8 
 
0.9 0.1 
 
2.9 0.6 
Closed gap - 
Benchmark 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.0 0.0 
(C) Friends and adversaries of an average Roma student 
Benchmark 3.1 1.4 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.1 1.3 
Closed gap 3.5 1.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.5 0.9 
Closed gap - 
Benchmark 
0.4 -0.3   0.0 0.0   0.4 -0.3 
 
Table B4.  
The simulated percent of non-Roma students with Roma friends and 
adversaries 
  Percent who have at least one 
  Roma friend Roma adversary 
Benchmark estimates 18 14 
Closing the achievement gap 25 5 
 
Policy simulation 3: Equal ethnic distribution of students and closing the 
achievement gap 
Our third simulation exercise combines the previous two. Table B5 shows the simulated 
number of friends and adversaries of Roma students, and Table B6 shows the simulated 
percent of non-Roma students with at least one Roma friend and the percent with at 
least one Roma adversary. 
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Table B5.  
The number of friends and adversaries of Roma students in the benchmark 
simulation and the simulated effect of equal ethnic distribution and closing 
the achievement gap at the same time 
  Number of   Number of   Number of 
  Friends Adversaries   
Roma 
Friends 
Roma 
Adversaries 
  
Non-
Roma 
Friends 
Non-Roma 
Adversaries 
(A) Friends and adversaries of low-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 2.7 1.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.7 1.6 
Equal distribution 
+ closed gap 
2.3 2.1 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
2.0 2.1 
Equal + closed gap 
- Benchmark 
-0.5 0.4 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.4 0.5 
(B) Friends and adversaries of high-achieving Roma students 
Benchmark 3.8 0.7 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.8 0.6 
Equal distribution 
+ closed gap 
3.7 0.9 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
3.6 0.9 
Equal + closed gap 
- Benchmark 
-0.1 0.1 
 
-0.8 -0.1 
 
0.7 0.2 
(C) Friends and adversaries of an average Roma student 
Benchmark 3.1 1.4 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
2.1 1.3 
Equal distribution 
+ closed gap 
3.2 1.3 
 
0.2 0.0 
 
3.1 1.3 
Equal + closed gap 
- Benchmark 
0.2 -0.1   -0.8 -0.1   1.0 0.0 
 
Table B6.  
The simulated percent of non-Roma students with Roma friends and 
adversaries 
  Percent who have at least one 
  Roma friend Roma adversary 
Benchmark estimates 18 14 
Equal distribution + closing the 
achievement gap 
32 10 
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S3 Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table C1.  
Ethnic identification in the sample. (All respondents who indicated a 
primary or a secondary identification) 
  
Primary 
identification (%) 
Secondary 
identification (%) 
Hungarian 81.5 6.9 
German 0.3 2.3 
Serbian 0.2 0.5 
Croat 0.1 0.4 
Romanian 0.8 1.2 
Slovak 0.0 0.5 
Roma 16.2 4.5 
Other 0.8 1.8 
No identification 0.2 82.0 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
Observations 3,430 3,430 
 
Table C2.  
The distribution of friendship and adversary nominations in the sample 
(percent) 
  
# same-sex friends  
nominated by   
# opposite-sex friends  
nominated by   
# adversaries  
nominated by 
  Roma Non-Roma All   Roma Non-Roma All   Roma Non-Roma All 
0 3 2 2 
 
21 17 18 
 
30 16 19 
1 6 4 4 
 
11 12 12 
 
15 13 13 
2 10 9 9 
 
11 15 14 
 
15 17 16 
3 14 13 14 
 
14 17 16 
 
12 19 18 
4 17 16 16 
 
13 11 11 
 
8 11 10 
5 50 56 55 
 
30 28 29 
 
20 24 24 
Sum 100 100 100   100 100 100   100 15 100 
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Table C3.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. OLS results without fixed-
effects. 
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.50 -0.36 -0.16 -0.03  0.66 -0.33 
 (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.03)** (0.01)*  (0.05)** (0.04)** 
Roma × GPA 0.19 -0.25 0.23 -0.01  -0.04 -0.24 
(0.11) (0.11)* (0.08)** (0.03)  (0.11) (0.11)* 
Roma -0.12 -0.13 1.19 0.05  -1.30 -0.17 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)** (0.04)  (0.12)** (0.08)* 
Class FE NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. The number of friendship and adversary nominations from all peers as well as 
from Roma and non-Roma peers separately, as functions of GPA and ethnicity of the 
student. Peers are same-sex classmates. GPA is publicly observable grade point-average 
ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be zero at its mean value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
Table C4.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. Results with class-gender fixed-
effects. 
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.67 -0.49 -0.11 -0.02  0.78 -0.47 
 (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.06)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.22 -0.19 0.11 -0.03  0.11 -0.16 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.10) 
Roma -0.02 0.11 0.28 -0.19  -0.30 0.31 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.10)** (0.05)**  (0.11)* (0.08)** 
Class-gender FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C5.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. Sample restricted to students 
who did not repeat grades and are not older than grade level age 15  
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.51 -0.37 -0.11 -0.01  0.61 -0.36 
 (0.06)** (0.05)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.06)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.22 -0.32 0.08 -0.07  0.14 -0.25 
(0.13) (0.12)* (0.08) (0.05)  (0.13) (0.12)* 
Roma -0.13 0.13 0.48 -0.14  -0.61 0.28 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.10)** (0.05)**  (0.13)** (0.10)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 2,935 2,935 2,935 2,935  2,935 2,935 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table C6. 
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. Sample restricted to common 
support (peer group has at least two Roma and two non-Roma members). 
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.48 -0.41 -0.21 -0.04  0.69 -0.37 
 (0.09)** (0.09)** (0.06)** (0.04)  (0.07)** (0.07)** 
Roma × GPA 0.42 -0.40 0.26 -0.01  0.16 -0.39 
(0.14)** (0.14)** (0.11)* (0.05)  (0.12) (0.12)** 
Roma 0.08 -0.02 0.54 -0.20  -0.47 0.19 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)** (0.06)**  (0.14)** (0.09)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,571 1,571 1,571 1,571  1,571 1,571 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C7.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. Results with control variables. 
Dep.va: 
nominations 
received 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.57 -0.41 -0.10 -0.02  0.67 -0.39 
 (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.06)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.15 -0.23 0.14 -0.04  0.01 -0.19 
(0.12) (0.11)* (0.08) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.10) 
Roma 0.05 0.01 0.46 -0.15  -0.41 0.16 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.10)** (0.05)**  (0.12)** (0.09) 
Repeated grade -0.04 0.17 0.12 -0.02  -0.16 0.20 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.15) (0.14) 
Female -0.33 0.15 0.05 0.03  -0.38 0.13 
(0.08)** (0.08)* (0.05) (0.03)  (0.08)** (0.07) 
Age 14 0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.04  0.06 -0.04 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.08) 
Age 16 -0.24 0.12 -0.05 0.10  -0.19 0.02 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.07) (0.05)  (0.14) (0.14) 
Age 17 or more -0.72 0.19 -0.28 0.03  -0.45 0.17 
(0.24)** (0.28) (0.13)* (0.08)  (0.20)* (0.24) 
Years in 
preschool 
0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.00  0.07 -0.05 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.05) (0.04) 
Mother’s educ. 
8 grades 
0.29 -0.23 0.12 -0.07  0.17 -0.16 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.14) (0.08)  (0.15) (0.17) 
Mother’s educ. 
vocational  
0.51 -0.32 0.08 -0.07  0.42 -0.25 
(0.22)* (0.21) (0.15) (0.08)  (0.16)* (0.17) 
Mother’s educ. 
high school 
0.48 -0.35 0.02 -0.05  0.46 -0.30 
(0.23)* (0.22) (0.15) (0.08)  (0.18)* (0.18) 
Mother’s educ. 
college  
0.29 -0.22 -0.02 0.03  0.30 -0.24 
(0.24) (0.23) (0.15) (0.09)  (0.20) (0.19) 
Mother’s educ. 
missing 
-0.09 0.21 0.31 -0.09  -0.39 0.30 
(0.65) (0.93) (0.23) (0.09)  (0.51) (0.92) 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,426 3,426 3,426 3,426  3,426 3,426 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C8.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. Results with class-gender fixed-
effects, control variables and sample restricted to common support. 
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
peers 
Friends Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  
From Roma 
classmates 
 
From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.45 -0.42 -0.20 -0.05  0.65 -0.36 
 (0.10)** (0.09)** (0.06)** (0.04)  (0.08)** (0.07)** 
Roma × GPA 0.36 -0.28 0.20 0.03  0.16 -0.32 
(0.15)* (0.14)* (0.11) (0.05)  (0.13) (0.13)* 
Roma 0.17 -0.04 0.39 -0.20  -0.22 0.17 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.13)** (0.07)**  (0.15) (0.10) 
Class-gender FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,567 1,567 1,567 1,567  1,567 1,567 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table C9.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. Nominations capped at 4.  
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.49 -0.42 -0.10 -0.02  0.60 -0.40 
 (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.05)** (0.04)** 
Roma × GPA 0.10 -0.25 0.08 -0.05  0.02 -0.21 
(0.12) (0.11)* (0.08) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.10)* 
Roma -0.06 0.10 0.47 -0.12  -0.53 0.23 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)** (0.04)**  (0.10)** (0.08)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C10.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. Nominations weighted by the 
friends of the nominating students.  
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
peers weighted 
by their friends 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.84 -0.45 -0.09 0.00  0.97 -0.43 
 (0.13)** (0.10)** (0.02)** (0.02)  (0.12)** (0.08)** 
Roma × GPA 0.34 -0.52 0.18 -0.04  -0.17 -0.39 
(0.26) (0.18)** (0.11) (0.05)  (0.19) (0.16)* 
Roma -0.39 0.11 0.65 -0.15  -1.24 0.34 
 (0.28) (0.19) (0.16)** (0.06)*  (0.24)** (0.14)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. Dependent variable: The number of friendship and adversary nominations from 
all peers as well as from Roma and non-Roma peers separately, weighted by the 
friendship nominations they receive; the number of same-sex friends of each nominating 
friend or adversary is added and the result is divided by two (when Roma or non-Roma 
nominations are considered only same ethnicity friends are added). Peers are same-sex 
classmates. Right hand side variable: GPA is publicly observable grade point-average 
ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be zero at its mean value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C11.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. Relations defined as the union 
of nominations given and received. 
Dependent 
variable: 
measure of 
popularity 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.31 -0.36 -0.13 0.02  0.47 -0.35 
 (0.05)** (0.06)** (0.02)** (0.02)  (0.05)** (0.05)** 
Roma × GPA 0.25 -0.19 0.08 0.01  0.15 -0.25 
(0.11)* (0.12) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.12)* 
Roma -0.03 -0.03 0.43 -0.31  -0.56 0.47 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)** (0.06)**  (0.12)** (0.12)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. Dependent variable: The number of friends and adversaries defined as the union 
of nominations given and received (number of peers who were nominated by the student 
or who nominated the student). All peers as well as from Roma and non-Roma peers 
separately. Peers are same-sex classmates. Right hand side variable: GPA is publicly 
observable grade point-average ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be zero at its mean 
value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table C12.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. Reciprocal relations. 
Dependent 
variable: 
measure of 
popularity 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.39 -0.03 -0.10 0.01  0.48 -0.04 
 (0.04)** (0.02)* (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.04)** (0.01)** 
Roma × GPA -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.01  -0.05 -0.03 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.03) 
Roma -0.06 0.06 0.49 -0.01  -0.55 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.08)** (0.02)  (0.09)** (0.03)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes. Dependent variable: The number of reciprocal friends and reciprocal adversaries 
(number of peers who were nominated by the student and who nominated the student at 
the same time). All peers as well as from Roma and non-Roma peers separately. Peers 
are same-sex classmates. Right hand side variable: GPA is publicly observable grade 
point-average ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be zero at its mean value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C13.  
Friends and adversaries as function of GPA. The Echenique-Fryer measure 
of popularity on the LHS. 
Dependent variable:  
measure of popularity 
Friends   Roma friends Non-Roma friends 
  of Roma students of non-Roma students 
GPA 0.14  -0.09 0.19 
 (0.02)**  (0.05) (0.02)** 
Roma × GPA 0.12    
 (0.05)*    
Roma -0.52    
 (0.17)**    
Class FE YES  YES YES 
N 3,429  774 2,853 
Notes. Dependent variable: The Echenique-Fryer (2007) measure of popularity, as used 
by Fryer and Torelli (2010). Intuitively, it measures the number of friends weighted by 
the number of their friends, iterated. Technically, it uses the symmetric matrix of 
connections (using the union of nominations given and received.), and takes the largest 
eigenvalue and the corresponding eigenvector of the matrix, multiplies the two, and 
multiplies it with the determinant of the matrix. The individual measure of is the value of 
this vector that corresponds to the individual. The measure can be computed for 
friendship among all students as well as friendship within ethnic groups (it is defined for 
symmetric and transitive relations, so it is not defined for adversary relationships or 
relationships across ethnic groups). 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C14.  
Friends and adversaries of opposite sex (nominations received) and GPA 
Dep. variable: # 
nominations 
from opposite-
sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.65 -0.75 -0.02 -0.08  0.66 -0.67 
 (0.08)** (0.06)** (0.02) (0.02)**  (0.07)** (0.06)** 
Roma × GPA 0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.01  0.02 -0.05 
(0.16) (0.13) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.12) 
Roma 0.06 0.10 0.21 -0.11  -0.15 0.21 
 (0.15) (0.10) (0.08)** (0.03)**  (0.12) (0.09)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table C15.  
Friends and adversaries and GPA, for students who identified as Roma in 
the 1st place, in the 2nd place (reference group: non-Roma) 
Dep. variable: # 
reciprocated 
nominations of 
opposite-sex  
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.58 -0.44 -0.11 -0.02  0.69 -0.42 
 (0.06)** (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.05)** (0.05)** 
Roma 1st × GPA 0.20 -0.25 0.19 -0.04  0.02 -0.21 
(0.14) (0.12)* (0.10) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.12) 
Roma 2nd × GPA 0.15 -0.33 0.17 -0.10  -0.02 -0.23 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.11) (0.08)  (0.20) (0.17) 
Roma in 1st place -0.15 0.12 0.58 -0.13  -0.72 0.25 
(0.14) (0.10) (0.11)** (0.05)**  (0.14)** (0.09)** 
Roma in 2nd 
place 
0.06 0.08 0.26 -0.17  -0.20 0.26 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.13)* (0.08)*  (0.18) (0.14) 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430  3,430 3,430 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C16.  
Friends and adversaries of female students as function of GPA.  
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
same-sex peers  
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.74 -0.53 -0.12 -0.04  0.86 -0.50 
 (0.09)** (0.09)** (0.04)** (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.08)** 
Roma × GPA 0.10 -0.13 0.08 0.02  0.03 -0.15 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.05)  (0.15) (0.15) 
Roma -0.16 0.16 0.19 -0.15  -0.35 0.30 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06)*  (0.14)* (0.12)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,666 1,666 1,666 1,666  1,666 1,666 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table C17.  
Friends and adversaries of male students as function of GPA.  
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
same-sex peers  
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.59 -0.45 -0.11 -0.00  0.71 -0.44 
 (0.09)** (0.07)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.06)** 
Roma × GPA 0.40 -0.28 0.18 -0.11  0.22 -0.18 
(0.19)* (0.14)* (0.11) (0.05)*  (0.17) (0.14) 
Roma 0.22 0.02 0.40 -0.27  -0.18 0.30 
 (0.23) (0.13) (0.15)** (0.07)**  (0.21) (0.11)** 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764  1,764 1,764 
Notes: see Table C3. Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C18.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA. Peer groups with 
high average GPA  
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
same-sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.73 -0.53 -0.07 -0.01  0.80 -0.52 
 (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.03)* (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.07)** 
Roma × GPA 0.25 -0.19 -0.00 0.06  0.25 -0.25 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.12) (0.05)  (0.18) (0.19) 
Roma -0.23 0.24 0.36 -0.05  -0.59 0.30 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.15)* (0.05)  (0.15)** (0.14)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,716 1,716 1,716 1,716  1,716 1,716 
Notes: see Table C3. Higher than average GPA: Average GPA in same-sex peer group is 
in the top half or the average GPA distribution (above 3.6). Standard errors, clustered at 
the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table C19.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA. Peer groups with 
low average GPA  
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
same-sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.50 -0.41 -0.15 -0.01  0.65 -0.39 
 (0.09)** (0.07)** (0.04)** (0.02)  (0.07)** (0.06)** 
Roma × GPA 0.41 -0.33 0.26 -0.13  0.15 -0.19 
(0.15)** (0.13)* (0.10)* (0.04)**  (0.15) (0.12) 
Roma 0.19 -0.04 0.48 -0.28  -0.29 0.24 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.13)** (0.05)**  (0.16) (0.11)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,771  1,771 1,771 
Notes: see Table C3. Lower than average GPA: Average GPA in same-sex peer group is in 
the bottom half or the average GPA distribution (less than or equal to 3.6). Standard 
errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C20.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA. Towns with lower 
than median prejudice 
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
same-sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.55 -0.41 -0.13 0.00  0.68 -0.40 
 (0.09)** (0.08)** (0.03)** (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.07)** 
Roma × GPA 0.15 -0.34 0.26 -0.11  -0.11 -0.23 
(0.17) (0.15)* (0.11)* (0.06)  (0.16) (0.14) 
Roma -0.13 0.02 0.55 -0.21  -0.68 0.23 
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.13)** (0.06)**  (0.17)** (0.12) 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,659 1,659 1,659 1,659  1,659 1,659 
Notes: see Table C3. Lower than average prejudice: Fraction of votes on Jobbik (far-right 
party) in town in the general election of 2010 is less than 22% (median in the sample). 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table C21.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA. Towns with higher 
than median prejudice 
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
same-sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From Roma 
classmates 
 From non-Roma 
classmates 
GPA 0.62 -0.47 -0.08 -0.03  0.70 -0.43 
 (0.08)** (0.06)** (0.03)* (0.02)  (0.08)** (0.06)** 
Roma × GPA 0.27 -0.21 0.07 -0.01  0.19 -0.20 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.11) (0.05)  (0.14) (0.14) 
Roma -0.06 0.18 0.45 -0.09  -0.51 0.27 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)** (0.07)  (0.15)** (0.12)* 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,771  1,771 1,771 
Notes: see Table C3. Fraction of votes on Jobbik (far-right party) in town in the general 
election of 2010 is more than or equal to 22% (median in the sample). Standard errors, 
clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C22.  
Friends and adversaries of students as function of GPA, interacted with 
mother’s education, subsample of non-Roma students. 
Dependent 
variable: 
nominations 
received from 
same-sex peers 
Friends  Adversaries Friends Adversaries  Friends Adversaries 
  From peers with low-
educated mother 
 From peers with high-
educated mother 
GPA 0.51 -0.40 -0.01 -0.06  0.52 -0.34 
 (0.06)** (0.05)** (0.03) (0.02)**  (0.06)** (0.05)** 
Low ed. mother 
× GPA 
0.12 0.00 0.05 0.02  0.07 -0.01 
(0.13) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.12) (0.11) 
Low ed. mother -0.21 0.19 -0.04 0.01  -0.17 0.18 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.09) 
Class FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
N 2,710 2,710 2,710 2,710  2,710 2,710 
Notes. The number of friendship and adversary nominations from all peers as well as 
from peers separated by whether they mother has low education, as functions of GPA 
and ethnicity of the student. Low educated mother: 0-8 primary schools (18% in the non-
Roma sample; it would be 70% in the Roma sample). Peers are same-sex classmates. 
GPA is publicly observable grade point-average ranging from 1 to 5, normalized to be 
zero at its mean value 3.5. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C23.  
Friends and adversaries of Roma students and the ethnic composition of 
their peer group, interacted with whether they have high GPA. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Number of 
friends  
Number of 
Adversaries 
 Number of 
friends 
Number of 
Adversaries 
High-GPA student 1.24 -1.01  1.25 -1.16 
 (0.23)** (0.19)**  (0.32)** (0.28)** 
Fraction Roma among 
peers 
4.27 -2.08  4.66 -0.95 
(0.96)** (0.97)*  (1.59)** (2.43) 
Fraction Roma squared -3.59 0.25  -4.21 0.45 
(0.93)** (1.09)  (1.34)** (1.91) 
High-GPA student 
interacted with fraction 
Roma squared 
-1.44 1.25  -1.18 1.05 
(0.43)** (0.34)**  (0.51)* (0.45)* 
Class FE NO NO  YES YES 
Control variables NO NO  NO NO 
N 710 710  710 710 
Notes. Peers refer to same-sex classmates (not including the student). High-GPA refers 
to grade point average higher than 3.5 (the overall average and median; the 80th 
percentile among Roma students and the 40th percentile among non-Roma students). 
The interaction of high-GPA and the linear term of fraction Roma is dropped from the 
specification as it is never statistically significant. The predicted left hand side variables 
have the same shape from the OLS and the FE regressions; they overlap completely for 
the number of friends and the discrepancy is small for the number of adversaries.  
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table C24.  
Friends and adversaries of Roma students and the ethnic composition of 
their peer group, interacted with whether they have high GPA. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Number of 
friends  
Number of 
Adversaries 
 Number of 
friends 
Number of 
Adversaries 
High-GPA student 1.10 -0.96  1.13 -1.03 
 (0.24)** (0.19)**  (0.34)** (0.32)** 
Fraction Roma among 
peers 
4.52 -2.14  4.83 -1.14 
(0.95)** (0.93)*  (1.62)** (2.49) 
Fraction Roma squared -3.83 0.36  -4.54 0.68 
(0.92)** (1.05)  (1.34)** (1.96) 
High-GPA student 
interacted with fraction 
Roma squared 
-1.34 1.19  -1.03 0.92 
(0.44)** (0.36)**  (0.51)* (0.51) 
Class FE NO NO  YES YES 
Control variables YES YES  YES YES 
N 707 707  707 707 
Notes. See Table C25. Control variables are gender, year of age dummies, whether 
repeated grade, years in preschool, mother’s education. 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table C25.  
The probability that non-Roma students nominate Roma students as friends 
and adversaries.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Nominated any 
Roma friend   
Nominated any 
Roma adversary 
Nominated any 
Roma friend   
Nominated any 
Roma adversary 
Fraction low-
GPA Roma 
among peers 
1.22 1.81 1.41 1.64 
(0.17)** (0.16)** (0.34)** (0.31)** 
Fraction low-
GPA Roma, 
squared 
-0.44 -2.01 -0.92 -1.80 
(0.24) (0.28)** (0.63) (0.63)** 
Fraction high-
GPA Roma 
among peers 
2.79 0.18 2.74 0.07 
(0.26)** (0.24) (0.38)** (0.39) 
Fraction high-
GPA Roma, 
squared 
-2.26 -0.27 -1.88 -0.60 
(0.54)** (0.54) (0.70)** (0.64) 
Constant 
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.03) (0.03)* 
Class FE NO NO YES YES 
N 2,719 2,719 2,719 2,719 
Notes. Peers refer to same-sex classmates.  High-achieving refers to grade point average 
higher than 3.5 (the overall average and median; the 80th percentile among Roma 
students and the 40th percentile among non-Roma students). The constant is the average 
of the class fixed-effects. The fraction Roma among peers and the fraction of high-GPA 
Standard errors, clustered at the class level, are in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Figure C1.  
The distribution of classes in the sample by the fraction of Roma students 
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(A) Fraction Roma by self-identification (B) Fraction Roma estimated by teacher 
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Figure C2.  
The distribution of students in the sample by their grade point average 
(GPA) 
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Figure C3.  
The distribution of students in the sample by their standardized test scores 
(reading and mathematics) 
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(A) Standardized reading test score (B) Standardized mathematics test score 
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Figure C4.  
The distribution of students in the number of friendship nominations they 
receive 
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(B) Received by Roma students (C) Received by non-Roma students 
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Figure C5.  
The distribution of students in the number of adversary nominations they 
receive 
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(B) Received by Roma students (C) Received by non-Roma students 
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Figure C6.  
Number of friends and adversaries of Roma students by the fraction of 
Roma students in the group. Same-sex nominations; number of 
nominations capped at 4 
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(A) Friends of Roma students (B) Adversaries of Roma students 
 
Figure C7.  
Number of friends and adversaries of Roma students by the fraction of 
Roma students in the group. Opposite-sex nominations 
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(A) Friends of Roma students (B) Adversaries of Roma students 
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Figure C8.  
The percentage of non-Roma students nominating Roma students as a 
friend and as an adversary. (Same-sex nominations; number of nominations 
capped at 4) 
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(A) Has a Roma friend (B) Has a Roma adversary 
Notes: As a function of the fraction of low-achieving Roma students and the fraction of 
high-GPA Roma students in the peer group. Both of these fractions are aggregated to 
categories. Variance of the estimates computed as p(1-p)/#schools). Peer group is 
defined as same-sex classmates. 
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Figure C9.  
The percentage of non-Roma students nominating Roma students as a 
friend and as an adversary (Opposite-sex nominations) 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 R
o
m
a
 f
ri
e
n
d
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Fraction Roma or fraction high-GPA Roma in peer group
Function of low-GPA Roma Function of high-GPA Roma
95% CI 95% CI
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 R
o
m
a
 a
d
v
e
rs
a
ry
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Fraction Roma or fraction high-GPA Roma in peer group
Function of low-GPA Roma Function of high-GPA Roma
95% CI 95% CI
 
(A) Has a Roma friend (B) Has a Roma adversary 
Notes: As a function of the fraction of low-achieving Roma students and the fraction of 
high-GPA Roma students in the peer group. Both of these fractions are aggregated to 
categories. Variance of the estimates computed as p(1-p)/#schools). Peer group is 
defined as opposite-sex classmates. 
 
 
 
